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NOTE
THE IRRATIONAL USE OF RATIONAL BASIS REVIEW IN LAW-
RENCE V. TEXAS 1 : IMPLICATIONS FOR OUR SOCIETY
Would you choose to live in a town where billboards advertise ani-
mals that people can use for their sexual gratification, grandfathers
have sex with their adult granddaughters, prostitutes are able to work
without fear of arrest, and people are free to expose their genitals to
one another in public? This town doesn't exist in North Carolina
because we have laws against such behavior.2 However, if you
wouldn't want to live in a place like this, don't breathe a sigh of relief
quite yet. The Supreme Court recently released an opinion, in Law-
rence v. Texas,3 that may enable your town to look a lot like the one
just mentioned.4
The actual holding in the case is not as alarming as the rationale
the Court used to arrive at its decision. The Court struck down a
Texas law that criminalized homosexual sodomy.5 However, the path
it took to arrive at this decision is different than it has taken before. If
the Court continues to follow the reasoning it used in Lawrence, the
field of constitutional law is in for some dramatic changes.
1. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
2. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-177 (2003) (making sex with an animal a Class I felony);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-178 (2003) (defining sex between a grandfather and his adult
granddaughter as incest, punishable as a Class F felony); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-203
(2003) (criminalizing prostitution); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.9(a) (2003) ("Any
person who shall willfully expose the private parts of his or her person in any public
place and in the presence of any other person or persons, of the opposite sex,... shall
be guilty of a Class 2 misdemeanor.").
3. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
4. Id. at 2495 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia explains that the Texas statute
in question was created to promote the belief that some forms of sexual behavior are
immoral, as are laws that forbid, inter alia, incest, bestiality, and obscenity. He goes
on to say, "[i]f, as the Court asserts, the promotion of majoritarian sexual morality is
not even a legitimate state interest, none of the above-mentioned laws can survive
rational-basis review."
5. Id. at 2472.
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This article seeks to explore both the reasoning and implications
of this new rationale by the Court. It will begin by relaying the facts
and background of the Lawrence case. Next, it will discuss the Court's
decision in Bowers v. Hardwick 6 and explore the constitutional law
foundations for the Court's traditional reasoning as displayed in Bow-
ers. The article will then turn to the Court's analysis of Lawrence.
Finally, it will address the potential far-reaching implications of the
Lawrence decision in the realm of constitutional law.
BACKGROUND OF LAWRENCE
Police officers in Houston, Texas were sent to a house to investi-
gate a call about a weapons disturbance.7 Once inside the home, the
officers found two men (Lawrence and Tyson) engaged in anal sex.8
The men were arrested under a Texas statute which makes sodomy a
misdemeanor offense.9 They were convicted by a Justice of the Peace,
and these convictions were affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the
Texas Fourteenth District.10 The Court of Appeals relied on the
Supreme Court decision in Bowers v. Hardwick" to affirm the convic-
tion. 2 The Supreme Court granted certiorari 13 to decide whether the
convictions violated the men's Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal
protection and due process, and whether Bowers should be
overruled.' 4
On appeal, the burden is on the petitioners in a facial challenge to
a statute to show that under every conceivable circumstance the stat-
ute is invalid. 15 This cannot be accomplished in Lawrence because it
would not be valid to protect against minors engaging in sodomy,
6. See 478 U.S. 186 (1986) overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472
(2003).
7. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2475.
8. Id. at 2476.
9. Id.; See TEX PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(A) (2003) ("A person commits an offense
if he engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the same sex.");
§21.01 (1) ("Deviate sexual intercourse" is defined as: "(A) any contact between any
part of the genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of another person; or (B) the
penetration of the genitals or the anus of another person with an object.").
10. Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d 349 (Tex. App. 2001).
11. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472
(2003)(finding no fundamental right to engage in sodomy).
12. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2476 (2003).
13. 537 U.S. 1044 (2002).
14. 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2476 (2003).
15. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1993).
[Vol. 26:21
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forced sodomy, or publicly engaging in sodomy. 16 The analysis by the
Court should have ended there, however this point was never men-
tioned in the opinion. Instead, the Court decided the case on substan-
tive due process grounds and found the Texas statute to have failed
rational basis review, thus invalidating it. 7 The Court also overruled
Bowers. 8
BOWERS V. HARDWICK
Before examining the Court's rationale in Lawrence, it is impor-
tant to understand its rationale in Bowers. The Court's reasoning in
Bowers represents the analysis generally applied to Constitutional mat-
ters prior to Lawrence. In 1982, Michael Hardwick was charged with
violating a Georgia statute against sodomy.' 9 The Georgia statute dif-
fers from the Texas statute at issue in Lawrence in that it prohibits
sodomy between heterosexuals as well as homosexuals. 20 The issue
before the Bowers Court was whether homosexuals have a fundamen-
tal right to engage in sodomy.21 Justice White, writing for the major-
ity, looked to two categories to determine whether this was a
fundamental right warranting strict scrutiny: "liberties that are
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" as well as liberties "deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition. ' 22 He found in our coun-
try's history a legacy of criminalizing sodomy.2 3 Deciding that sod-
omy was not a fundamental right, he proceeded to use rational basis
review and sustained the law as a rational way for Georgia to promote
its legitimate goal of encouraging public morality.24 The reasoning
used by the Bowers Court was in line with other opinions of the Court
that have decided cases based on substantive due process grounds.
16. Brief of Amici Curiae American Center for Law and Justice at 10, Lawrence
(No. 02-102).
17. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484. The majority declined to use an equal protection
analysis, although Justice O'Connor relied on equal protection grounds for her
concurrence.
18. Id.
19. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 187-88.
20. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2a (2002) ("A person commits the offense of sodomy
when he performs or submits to any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person
and the mouth or anus of another.").
21. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190.
22. Id. at 191-92 (citations omitted).
23. Id. at 192.
24. Id. at 196 ("The law, however, is constantly based on notions of morality, and
if all laws representing essentially moral choices are to be invalidated under the Due
Process Clause, the courts will be very busy indeed.").
2004]
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A Review Of Substantive Due Process
In the early 1930s, state laws exercising the use of police powers
were given great deference by the Court.25 A change came in United
States v. Carolene Products Co., when the Court gave itself room to
increase its scrutiny of a law that "appears on its face to be within a
specific prohibition of the Constitution .... 26 For almost thirty years,
the Court gave heightened scrutiny to laws restricting the enumerated
rights in the Bill of Rights, while giving deference to the rest.27 Over
the years, more cases have shown the Court is also willing to increase
the scrutiny given to the restriction of unenumerated rights.28
In order to establish boundaries for itself and to promote judicial
restraint, the Court has decided to protect rights that are well estab-
lished in our history and tradition or that are vital to our concept of
liberty.29 Laws restricting these so called fundamental rights (whether
enumerated in the Constitution or not) must be supported by a com-
pelling state interest and must be a narrowly tailored means of achiev-
ing those interests in order to be upheld.3 ° Most other rights are
subject to rational review, which need only be supported by a legiti-
mate government interest and rational means of accomplishing that
interest.3 1
The debate continues about what level of generality one should
apply in order to find these rights. After all, the level of generality used
determines whether that right will be found in tradition. Is it a right to
life or right to privacy?32 Is it a right of parenthood or right of an
25. O'Gorman & Young, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U.S. 251, 257-58 (1931)
("[T]he presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual
foundation of record for overthrowing the statute.").
26. 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (suggesting heightened scrutiny for laws that
interfere with the political process, laws directed at discrete and insular minorities,
and laws within a prohibition of the Constitution).
27. Randy Barnett, "Justice Kennedy's Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence v. Texas,"
Boston University School of Law, Working Paper Series, Public Law and Legal
Thought, No. 03-13, page 8.
28. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (finding a right of privacy);
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (finding a right to marry); Pierce v. Soc'y of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (finding a parental right to decide how to educate their
children).
29. See Synder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) ("[S]o rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental..."); Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937) ("[Ilmplicit in the concept of ordered
liberty..."); Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
30. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993).
31. 123 S. Ct. at 2492 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
32. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
[Vol. 26:21
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adulterous father to a child born out of wedlock?33 Is it a right to
personal autonomy or the right to engage in sodomy?34 If a right is
construed too generally, it becomes problematic to define what is
included in that broad right. The liberty and personal autonomy
found by Justice Kennedy could include any number of rights that
have never been recognized before. Looking to the most specific level
of generality in tradition judges subjectively make important determi-
nations rather than relying on our history or Constitution.35 There
needs to be some kind of criteria for judges to use to choose the rele-
vant tradition in order to keep uniformity and cohesion in the Court's
decisions.36
ANALYSIS OF LAWRENCE
A Liberty Right In The Constitution
The most striking aspect of this opinion is that Justice Kennedy
has strayed from the Court's well established substantive due process
jurisprudence. 37 He never declares homosexual sodomy to be a funda-
mental right worthy of strict scrutiny.38 Rather, he uses the term "lib-
erty" as opposed to "fundamental rights. 39
The issue in the opinion is stated, "whether the petitioners were
free as adults to engage in [sodomy] in the exercise of their liberty
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution."4" In fact, one of the problems Justice Kennedy has with
the Bowers decision is that the Court framed the issue as a right to
engage in sodomy rather than as a. liberty right.4' He mentions this
liberty right, which is ensured by the Constitution, several times in his
33. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 (1989).
34. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. 2472.
35. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127 n.6 ("Because such general traditions provide such
imprecise guidance, they permit judges to dictate rather than discern the society's
views."). Interestingly, this footnote was the only part of the opinion Justice Kennedy
did not join.
36. Id. ("[A] rule of law that bids neither by text nor by any particular, identifiable
tradition is no rule of law at all.").
37. Barnett, supra note 27, at 13 ("In the majority's opinion there is not even a
pretense of a 'fundamental right' rebutting the 'presumption of constitutionality'.
Justice Kennedy never mentions any presumption to be accorded the Texas
legislature.").
38. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2488 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
39. Barnett, supra note 27, at 13.
40. 123 S. Ct. at 2476 (emphasis added).
41. Id. at 2478 ("Having misapprehended the claim of liberty there presented to it,
and thus stating the claim to be whether there is a fundamental right to engage in
20041
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opinion.4 2 Despite all of his focus on liberty rights, it is important to
note, as Justice Scalia astutely points out in his dissent, "there is no
right to liberty under the Due Process Clause, although today's opin-
ion repeatedly makes that claim. '43 Concerns have been voiced that
grounding their decisions in nothing more than "liberty" would open
the door to find liberty anywhere a particular Justice wanted to find
it. 4 4 That fear has been realized in Lawrence. The opinion by Justice
Kennedy rests on the liberty we are afforded by the Constitution,
although he never attaches that liberty to any kind of historical or enu-
merated right.
The only time in his opinion Justice Kennedy discusses "rights
deeply rooted" in our history is to say that the historical analysis
undertaken in Bowers might not have been accurate.45 He eventually
says it is not important to look too closely at history.46 How can it not
be important to look at the history of the treatment of sodomy by our
courts and legislature when trying to decide whether there is a funda-
mental right involved? The reason history is not important to Justice
Kennedy's decision is because he is not trying to establish the right to
engage in sodomy as a fundamental right. Instead, he says, "[t]heir
right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives [homosexuals] the
full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the
government."
47
Not too long ago Justice Kennedy wrote, "courts must use consid-
erable restraint, including careful adherence to the incremental instruc-
consensual sodomy..."); Id. at 2478 ("[The framing of the issue in Bowers] discloses
the Court's own failure to recognize the extent of the liberty at stake.").
42. Id. at 2475 ("Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government
intrusions into a dwelling or other private places."); Id. at 2478 ("The liberty protected
by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to make this choice"); Id. at
2484 ("Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to
engage in their conduct without intervention of the government.").
43. Id. at 2491 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia goes on to point out that the
Due Process Clause actually allows the deprivation of a person's liberty as long as it is
done with due process of law.
44. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191 ("Striving to assure itself and the public that
announcing rights not readily identifiable in the Constitution's text involves much
more than the imposition of the Justices' own choice of values on the States and the
Federal Government, the Court has sought to identify the nature of the rights
qualifying for heightened judicial protection.").
45. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478.
46. Id. ("We need not enter this debate in the attempt to reach a definitive
historical judgment, but the following considerations counsel against adopting the
definitive conclusions upon which Bowers placed such reliance.").
47. Id. at 2484 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 26:21
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tion given by the precise facts of particular cases, as they seek to give
further and more precise definition to the right. '4 8 He was giving cau-
tion to how parental rights, which come from concepts of liberty
grounded in the 14th amendment, were defined.49 Unfortunately, Jus-
tice Kennedy does not heed his own advice in Lawrence. In the past,
the Court has recognized rights rooted in marriage, having children,
and raising children, but it has never recognized a right to have sex
outside of marriage.5 ° Instead of carefully examining our history and
traditions and from those traditions asserting a right we have long rec-
ognized, the Court declares, with a stroke of a pen, that people have a
constitutional liberty to engage in same-sex sodomy. Justice Kennedy
does so using neither "considerable restraint" nor a "precise definition
to the right."
5 1
In order to justify this liberty, the majority asserted the fact that
many states have recently repealed their laws against sodomy.52 The
Court also discusses how other countries deal with this issue.
53 If
these are the new standards for determining what the Constitution
means, we should start preparing now for numerous changes in our
laws and society. Analyzing current trends, instead of history, means
the Court must become a "micro-managing super-legislature, continu-
ally assessing current legislative trends to determine the current extent
of protection under the Fourteenth Amendment ... Constitution-
ally protected liberties will be found from any number of trends and
passions of the current era, only to be repealed in a few years by the
next mood swing of the general public.
Surprisingly, the majority places a great deal of importance on
what European countries think about the right to engage in homosex-
ual sodomy.55 When did we start interpreting our Constitution by
examining what other countries think? The question before the Court
was not whether the Texas law was a good law, but rather whether it
offended the United States Constitution. The way in which other
countries deal with the issue of homosexual sodomy may be relevant
in forming our public policy, however it is not relevant to what rights
48. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 95-96 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
49. See id.
50. Respondent's Brief at 20-21, Lawrence (No. 02-102).
51. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. 2472.
52. See id. at 2481.
53. Id.
54. Respondent's Brief at 16, Lawrence (No. 02-102).
55. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2481 ("Of even more importance ... the European
Court of Human Rights considered a case with parallels to Bowers and to today's
case.").
2004]
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our Constitution says states are allowed to restrict.5 6 If the Court is
deciding questions about our laws by evaluating how other countries
deal with political issues, rather than by analyzing and applying our
Constitution, why is the Supreme Court necessary? Political polls and
surveys of other countries may be taken without the aid of the Justices.
Justice Breyer has stated publicly that he questions whether the
Constitution will remain relevant as our world continues to become
smaller through globalization. 7 For a Supreme Court Justice to make
this statement is revolutionary. This comment sheds light on the ways
in which he makes decisions. Justice Breyer's remarks suggest the
United States Constitution is not the only consideration in the Justices'
conference room. The public needs to be more informed about what is
motivating the decisions the Court makes. Are the justices interpret-
ing the Constitution or are they creating social policy out of their own
biases?
THE COURT AS LEGISLATOR
The Court is making public policy with this very political deci-
sion. The Court took it upon itself to rectify a Texas law that the
majority of the Court thought was antiquated and irresponsible, even
though that is not the job of the Court.58 The job of repealing laws
belongs to the Texas legislature.5 9 Justice Kennedy justifies invalidat-
ing the Texas law, which does not infringe any fundamental right or
affect any suspect class, by saying, "times can blind us to certain truths
and later generations can see that laws once thought necessary and
proper in fact serve only to oppress. '60 While it is true that an anti-
quated law can and should be repealed, it is the responsibility of the
56. See Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 990 n. 1 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in
denial of certiorari) ("While Congress, as a legislature, may wish to consider the
actions of other nations on any issue it likes, this Court's [constitutional]
jurisprudence should not impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans.").
57. This Week with George Stephanopoulos (ABC News broadcast, July 6, 2003)
("[Wihether our Constitution and how it fits into the governing documents of other
nations, I think will be a challenge for the next generations.").
58. See Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979) ("Uludicial intervention is
generally unwarranted no matter how unwisely we may think a political branch has
acted.").
59. See Brief of Amici Curiae Texas Legislators, Representative Warren Chisum, et
al. at 17-25, Lawrence (No. 02-102) ("Determining for all States such a controversial
public policy issue found nowhere in the Constitution would be a mistake. This core
area of marriage, the family, and appropriate sexual behavior should be left to the
States.").
60. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484.
[Vol. 26:21
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legislative branch to make such determinations.6 1 The Court itself has
said it must be careful in extending protection to an asserted liberty
right, because by doing so the matter is taken out of the hands of the
public and into the hands of the members of the Court and their own
preferences. 62 Again, in Lawrence, the Court did not heed its own
advice. Rather, the majority decided an issue based on its own prefer-
ences and took the issue away from the legislature to decide.
The fact that many states have repealed their sodomy laws in
recent years reveals people who were opposed to the Bowers ruling have
successfully lobbied their respective legislators for a change in the
laws, indicating the way in which democracy is supposed to work.63
Courts should not invalidate laws based on the premise they are
unwise or unpopular because citizens, through their votes, are empow-
ered with that authority. 64 The legislature is responsible for changing
standards of morality in keeping with public opinion, but, "any lag in
legislative response to a mere change of public opinion ... cannot and
must not constitute the basis for a finding that the legislature's original
enactment exceeded its constitutional authority. 65
The Bowers Court said there was no fundamental right to sodomy
only seventeen years ago.66 What has happened in the last seventeen
years to overturn its precedent? One reason the Court gave for overrul-
ing Bowers was the amount of controversy surrounding the case.67 If
controversy is the barometer, the Court will soon become the rubber
stamp for whatever is popular thought at the time, instead of protec-
tors of the Constitution. Inevitably, the opinions of the Court will
61. Id. at 2497 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("But it is the premise of our system that
those judgments [to repeal laws] are to be made by the people, and not imposed by a
governing caste that knows best."); United States v. Henderson, 34 MJ. 174, 178 (C.
M. A. 1992) ("The Legislative Branch, of course, is free to modify its statute if it
chooses, and the Executive could limit prosecution. As a court, however, we are not
involved in the merits of the policy. We interpret statutes; and we can strike them
down only when they violate the Constitution.").
62. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) ("By extending
constitutional protection to an asserted right or liberty interest, we, to a great extent,
place the matter outside the arena of public debate and legislative action.").
63. Brief Amicus Curiae of the Center for the Original Intent of the Constitution at
28, Lawrence (No. 02-102).
64. New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (per curiam) (explaining it is
not for the courts, "to judge the wisdom or desirability of legislative policy
determinations made in areas that neither affect fundamental rights nor proceed along
suspect lines.").
65. Respondent's Brief at 49, Lawrence (No. 02-102).
66. See Bowers, 478 U.S. 186.
67. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2483.
20041
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change as the political tides of the country change. If the Court makes
decisions based on public opinion rather than following substantive
due process jurisprudence, the Justices will be interpreting political
polls instead of our Constitution.
THE EQUAL PROTECTION ARGUMENT
Although not addressed by the majority, Justice O'Connor relied
on her analysis of the Equal Protection claim in her concurring opin-
ion.68 The state argued the law in question regulates conduct, not a
class of people, but Justice O'Connor insisted the law is aimed at
homosexuals as a class because it is aimed at something so central to
whom they are.69 Whether homosexuals are discriminated against as
a class or not, the law should still be examined under rational basis
review because homosexuals are not a suspect class which warrants
heightened scrutiny. 70 Because this law does not facially distinguish
between homosexuals and heterosexuals (only homosexual conduct
performed by homosexuals, heterosexuals, or bisexuals), the Court
must find the intent to discriminate in order to use heightened
scrutiny.7'
There is no evidence of animus toward homosexuals on the part
of the legislators who created the law.72 The fact that the Texas legisla-
ture repealed the part of the law that pertained to heterosexual sodomy
could be an example of the fact that it is taking systematic steps to
harmonize its laws with decisions the Court has made regarding the
fundamental rights of the married.73 Within the context of rational
review, it is permitted for the state action to be underinclusive in its
approach to solving a problem.74 The legislature may make laws to
deal with one part of the problem without addressing other parts of
the same problem and still satisfy rational review.75
68. Id. at 2484 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
69. Id. at 2486-87 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
70. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 -32 (1996).
71. United States R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 181 (1980) ("If the adverse
impact on the disfavored class is an apparent aim of the legislature, its impartiality
would be suspect. If, however, the adverse impact may reasonably be viewed as an
acceptable cost of achieving a larger goal, an impartial lawmaker could rationally
decide that that cost should be incurred.").
72. Brief of Amici Curiae Texas Legislators, Representative Warren Chisum, et al.
at 2, Lawrence (No. 02-102).
73. Respondent's Brief at 26, Lawrence (No. 02-102).
74. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955).
75. Id.
[Vol. 26:21
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Finding no fundamental right or suspect class, the Court (both
the majority and concurring opinions) used rational review to decide
the case.76 Usually, all that is required to satisfy rational review is any
conceivable legitimate interest on the part of the state for the law in
question and that the law was a rational means of accomplishing that
interest.77 Despite such a low bar, in this case, the Court found no
legitimate interest.78
The state asserted its interest in promoting public morality as its
reason for creating a sodomy law.79 The Court said the promotion of
morality is not a legitimate state interest.80 This is contrary to what
the Court has said in the past.8' The Lawrence Court proceeded to
overrule Bowers, which said the state's interest in promoting morality
was enough to satisfy rational basis review.82 There are a number of
court decisions that have relied on Bowers in finding that morality is
enough to sustain a law under rational review.83 "[C]ountless judicial
decisions and legislative enactments have relied on the ancient pro-
position that a governing majority's belief that certain sexual behavior
is 'immoral and unacceptable' constitutes a rational basis for regula-
tion."84 Are all of these laws to be overturned now that Bowers has
76. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2488 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
77. See Fritz, 449 U.S. at 181 (Stevens, concurring).
78. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484.
79. Respondent's Brief at 27, Lawrence (No. 02-102).
80. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484.
81. Respondent's Brief at 42, Lawrence (No. 02-102). Respondent lists several
examples of the Court supporting the state's interest in promoting morality as part of
its police power. (See, e.g., Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1884) (holding that
the Equal Protection Clause was not intended "to interfere with the power of the state
... to prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace, morals, education, and good
order of the people."); Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105, 111-12 (1928)
("The police power may be exerted in the form of state legislation ... only when such
legislation bears a real and substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or
some other phase of the general welfare."); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954)
(identifying "public safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet [and] law and
order" as appropriate "application[s] of the police power to municipal affairs"); Barnes
v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569 (1991) (plurality opinion) (holding that police
powers of the State extend to "public health, safety and morals").").
82. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2483-84.
83. Id. at 2490 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
84. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (including, inter alia, Alabama's prohibition on the
sale of sex toys in order to safeguard public morality, federal statute and regulations
banning from military service those who engage in homosexual conduct, and the
rejection of a claimed constitutional right to commit adultery) (citations omitted).
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been overruled? 5 There are countless other laws based on morality in
this country.8 6 The majority mistakenly gives no weight to this once
established basis in its decision. With this part of the decision, the
Court has again departed from what it has said in the past.
Besides the asserted reason given by the state, the Court also read
a number of amicus briefs which laid out conceivable legitimate rea-
sons for the law.8 7 Justice Kennedy does not address or even mention
any of them in his opinion. For example, is it not legitimate for the
state of Texas to want to protect its citizens from disease? Over half of
the men in Texas who are infected with AIDS contracted it by homo-
sexual contact, while only five percent of the men contracted it
through heterosexual contact.8 8 It seems rational to forbid homosex-
ual sex as a step in eliminating the problem. After all, it is only neces-
sary for the law to be rationally related to the goal, it does not have to
be the perfect way to go about solving the problem. 9
Justice O'Connor said in her concurrence, "Texas cannot assert
any legitimate state interest here, such as national security or preserv-
ing the traditional institution of marriage." 9° In fact, the promotion of
the institution of marriage was asserted by several interested parties to
this case.91 A brief by Texas legislators explained that this law is but
one in a series of laws designed to promote marriage and discourage
sex outside of marriage. 92 Texas penalizes, and in some cases
criminalizes, extra-marital sexual conduct.93 The law against homo-
sexual sodomy could be one more way to encourage people not to have
85. Id. at 2495 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("This effectively decrees the end of all
morals legislation.").
86. Brief of Amici Curiae American Center for Law and Justice at 18, Lawrence
(No. 02-102). Bans on race discrimination, obscenity, pornography, corruption of
minors, fraud, ethical breaches in the legal profession, and gambling are just a few
examples.
87. Namely, public health and promotion of marriage, both addressed below.
88. Texas HIV/STD Annual Report 2001, 12 (Texas Dept. of Health Bureau of HIV
& STD), available at www.tdh.state.tx.us/hivstd/legislature/2001.pdf (last visited Aug.
15, 2003).
89. Williamson, 348 U.S. at 487.
90. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2487-88.
91. Brief of Amici Curiae Texas Legislators, Representative Warren Chisum, et al.
at 17-25, Lawrence (No. 02-102); Brief Amicus Curiae of the Family Research Council,
Inc. and Focus on the Family at 20-26, Lawrence (No.02-102); Brief of Amici Curiae
Center for Marriage Law, Lawrence (No. 02-102).
92. Brief of Amici Curiae Texas Legislators, Representative Warren Chisum, et al.
at 20, Lawrence (No. 02-102).
93. Id. at 23.
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sex outside of marriage.94 Why was this given no consideration by the
Court? Perhaps the reason is that it didn't fit into the Court's agenda.
In Justice O'Connor's use of rational review in her Equal Protec-
tion analysis, she suggested a "more searching form of rational basis
review" be used when a "law exhibits a desire to harm a politically
unpopular group."9" Evidence shows that homosexuals are not a "dis-
crete and insular minority" in need of extra protection. There are
already sixteen states and countless cities that provide government
employees some benefits or recognition to domestic partners of homo-
sexuals.96 Across the country there are countless elected officials who
are openly homosexual, ranging from U.S. Congressmen to city school
board members.97 The homosexual cause is spearheaded by Lambda
Legal, an organization with a carefully drawn and successful plan, to
have courts change public policy in the area of homosexual issues.98
This is not a group without power in our political system. This is not a
group that warrants anything more than rational basis review.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
Constitutional Right To Same-Sex Marriage
The implications of this decision, and more importantly how it
was justified, are only beginning to be seen, but will no doubt be felt
by generations to come. Most. of the speculation centers around the
effect it will have on same-sex marriages. Nowhere in the opinion does
the Court say it supports same-sex marriages, but if one reads between
the lines this support is evident.99 Specifically, the support is hinted at
94. Id.
95. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2485 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
96. See http://www.actwin.com/eatonohio/gay/dompar.htm (last visited Sept. 28,
2003). The states are: California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, New York, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington. Three of the cities are here in North
Carolina: Chapel Hill, Durham, and Carrboro.
97. See http://www.actwin.com/eatonohio/gay/openhopo.htm (last visited Sept.
28, 2003).
98. See http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/documents/record?record=1207
(last modified Feb. 5, 2000) ("Nothing illustrates the strength of our strategies more
than our current U.S. Supreme Court challenge to Texas's sodomy law. The case
represents the culmination of our carefully laid plan to use the state courts to get rid of
many of these horrible [sodomy] laws, while simultaneously developing the best case
to take to the nation's highest court and try to eliminate these laws once and for all.").
This is Lambda Legal's website, which explains its many successes and plans for the
future.
99. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2498 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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between these lines: "our laws and tradition afford constitutional pro-
tection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contra-
ception, family relationships, child rearing, and education," and
"[p]ersons in a homosexual relationship may seek autonomy for these
purposes, just as heterosexual persons do."100 There seems to be little
question Justice Kennedy believes same-sex marriage to be in the same
realm of personal autonomy and liberty that he defends in Lawrence.
If Lawrence shows us nothing else, it shows us that the political views
of Supreme Court Justices carry a lot of weight. Is the constitutionally
protected right to same-sex marriages that far off? Justice Kennedy's
opinion must have been understood by the public to be opening the
door for same-sex marriage. Why else would the Dallas Morning News
start running ads for same sex unions on its wedding announcement
pages less than a month after the Lawrence decision?' 0 1 This is yet
another example of the fact that the Court was too active in setting
public policy.
The Equal Protection argument, raised by the petitioners in Law-
rence, is another door for same-sex marriage advocates to try to walk
through.'0 2 Justice O'Connor's Equal Protection analysis centers on
the fact that men can violate this statute only by having sex with other
men. 10 3 It is the gender of the person the man has sex with that makes
the action legal or not.'0 4 Justice Scalia points out the same argument
can be made for laws regarding same-sex marriage.10 5 It is the gender
of the person the man marries that determines whether the marriage
will be legally recognized.10 6 Only Justice O'Connor examined the
Equal Protection claim in Lawrence, so it will remain to be seen what
the other Justices will do if such an argument is brought before them.
There is a federal law that says states do not have to recognize
same-sex marriages which are recognized in other states. ' 0 7 Once one
100. Id. at 2481-82.
101. See Joan Biskupic, Court's Opinion on Gay Rights Reflects Trends, USA TODAY,
July 17, 2003, at A.02 available at 2003 WL 5315568.
102. See 123 S. Ct. at 2495 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000) ("No State, territory, or possession of the United
States, or Indian tribe, shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or
judicial proceeding of any other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a
relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the
laws of such other State, territory, possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from
such relationship.").
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of the states decides to recognize same-sex marriages this law will
probably be challenged under the Full Faith and Credit clause of the
Constitution.'08 If the law is struck down by the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, all states will be forced to recognize same-sex marriages
whether or not same-sex marriages are actually legal in that state.109
This would not be the result of people voting to legalize same-sex mar-
riages. Rather, it would be the indirect result of the Supreme Court
decision in Lawrence.
OPENING THE DOOR TO NEW RIGHTS
The Lawrence decision also opens the door to finding new consti-
tutionally protected rights. Justice Kennedy concluded his opinion by
saying, "[a]s the Constitution endures, persons in every generation can
invoke its principles in their own search for greater freedom."'1 0 Imag-
ine the number of times this sentence will be quoted in court decisions
in the coming years either as a justification for a new right that court
has found or as a plea from citizens looking for justification for their
actions. In fact, it has already been quoted.'1 ' This statement appears
to be a free pass for judges to find "fundamental rights" or "liberty
interests" wherever they want to find them. This is one more example
of the Court exerting legislative power instead of judicial review.
A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DIE
Petitioners argue that when the fundamental rights to intimate
relationships, bodily integrity, and the sanctity of the home are com-
bined, one can find the liberty to engage in consensual, adult, noncom-
mercial homosexual sex.' 12 If the Court is convinced by this, as it
appears Justice Kennedy is, there are implications for laws against
committing or helping someone commit suicide because assisted sui-
108. Evan P. Schultz, A More Perfect Union: The Supreme Court's road to upholding
gay marriage is not exactly a straight one, LEGAL TIMES, July 21, 2003.
109. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. ("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State
to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the
Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and
Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.").
110. 123 S. Ct. at 2472.
111. See Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 271 F. Supp. 2d 1217 (C.D. Cal. 2003)
(requesting a parental liberty interest in introducing their children to matters relating
to sex in accordance with the parents' personal or religious values and beliefs);
Standhardt v. Super. Ct. of Ariz., 77 P.3d 451, 458 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (searching for
a right to same-sex marriage).
112. Petitioners Brief at 9, Lawrence (No. 02-102).
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cide also involves rights of bodily integrity, intimate relationships, and
sanctity of the home.
In Washington v. Glucksberg, the Court grappled with the issue as
to whether a person had the right to assisted suicide.1 13 The Court
explained that even though, "many of the rights and liberties protected
by the Due Process Clause sound in personal autonomy [this] does not
warrant the sweeping conclusion that any and all important, intimate,
and personal decisions are so protected .... ,," Justice Kennedy
joined in that opinion. 15 The Lawrence opinion suggests he has
changed his mind. He now seems to be saying that all intimate and
personal decisions are protected. How many of the other Justices have
changed their minds as well?
In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, the Court sug-
gested there is a fundamental right to refuse unwanted medical treat-
ment. 1 16 The Court of Appeals in Washington relied on the holding in
Cruzan to declare there is a right to die. 1 7 When the Supreme Court
overruled the Court of Appeals it made sure to explain, "[tlhe right
assumed in Cruzan ... was not simply deduced from abstract concepts
of personal autonomy."118 Again, it seems the Court has not heeded
its own advice and has done in Lawrence exactly what it cautioned
against in Washington. It found a protected liberty right to engage in
homosexual sodomy in the abstract concept of personal autonomy and
liberty of the Fourteenth Amendment." 9 The next time a right to die
case comes before the Court, you can be sure the petitioner will be in
"search for greater freedom" because of Lawrence.
LEGALIZATION OF VICTIMLESS CRIMES
The Lawrence Court seems to imply that as long as the action
involved is consensual and private, the government should not inter-
fere.' 2 ° What does that mean for the laws we have against private con-
sensual acts such as drugs, prostitution, adult incest, polygamy,
pornography, gambling, and suicide? Many of these laws are based on
113. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
114. Id. at 727-28 (citations omitted).
115. Id. at 704.
116. 497 U.S. 261, 278-79 (1990).
117. Washington, 521 U.S. at 725.
118. Id.
119. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. 2472.
120. Id. at 2482 ("The case . . . involve[s] two adults who, with full and mutual
consent from each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual
lifestyle. The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives.").
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the state interest in promoting morality, which, as we have seen above,
the Court no longer finds legitimate for restricting freedom. To many
people these come as welcome words. We are a society that values
freedom above all else. We are an "it's all about you' 1 2' and "do what
feels good"'122 society. Why should the government be able to tell us
what we can and cannot do in our own homes? Whose morality must
we be forced to live by?
Initially, the idea of unlimited freedom, unless someone is going
to be injured, sounds appealing. The major problem with this concept
is that we do not live in isolation. The things we do in private have
ramifications on the society in which we live. We deny reality when we
think because an act is in private it has no effect on the one doing it or
on others. The Clinton scandal reminded us all of that fact. When it
was discovered what President Clinton had been doing in private, the
nation reconsidered its choice of him as President. 123
The word "morality" means "conformity with recognized rules of
correct conduct."'124 Some kind of standard of what is right and what
is wrong must be established in any society for people to know how to
interact with one another. The well known book, The Lord of the Flies,
explores this idea. 125 The story is about a group of boys who are living
on a deserted island after their plane was shot down during a war. 126
The story suggests that if we were left to our own desires, without any
rules or morals to guide us, we would deteriorate into a society of
savages. 127 This is just a fictional story, but it communicates real con-
cerns people have about a society where anything goes. It is precisely
because of this fact we give up some of our freedoms when we join a
society. The Supreme Court recognized over a century ago that this
power to restrict our freedoms for the common good "must exist some-
where; else society will be at the mercy of the few, who, regarding only
their own appetites or passions, may be willing to imperil the peace
121. This is the slogan for Day-Timer, Inc. See http:/www.daytimer.com (last visited
Sept. 30, 2003).
122. This is the slogan for Diet Coke. See http:/www.dietcoke.com (last visited
September 27, 2003).
123. It is interesting to note, if President Clinton had lived in Georgia, he could have
been convicted under the statute in Bowers because it applied to heterosexual sodomy
as well homosexual acts. His actions in private and lying to cover it up led to
impeachment hearings.
124. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 456 (Second Pocket ed. 2001).
125. See generally WiLLIAM GOLDING, LORD OF THE FLIES (Berkley Publishing Group
1954).
126. Id.
127. Id.
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and security of the many, provided only they are permitted to do as
they please."1 2 8 The Court went on to say that it is the role of the
legislative branch to "exert what are known as the police powers of the
State, and to determine, primarily, what measures are appropriate or
needful for the protection of the public morals, the public health, or
the public safety."'
1 29
The police powers given to the states do not mean the state is free
to trample on our freedoms. It means the state has power to require its
citizens to abide by standards of right and wrong in the way they deal
with each other. What the majority of the public thinks is moral will
inevitably change over time, "but what has not changed is the under-
standing that government may require adherence to certain widely
accepted moral standards and sanction deviation from those stan-
dards, so long as it does not interfere with constitutionally protected
liberties."'13 The majority in Lawrence did not say moral standards
were interfering with constitutionally protected liberties. The Court
took it a step further and declared that moral standards are not even a
legitimate state interest.13 1
Interestingly, in making its decision, the Lawrence Court speaks
in terms of "demeaning the existence" of homosexuals by having laws
that restrict their ability to have personal relationships of their choos-
ing.132 The Court must think it would be immoral to demean their
existence. A prostitute could easily make the argument that her exis-
tence has been demeaned by laws that restrict her choice to have con-
sensual sex with whomever will pay her. However, all states other than
Nevada have decided to make prostitution illegal. The reason for
criminalizing it is an effort to protect public order and morality. 1 33
When all is said and done, the real issue for the Court in this case does
not seem to be whether morality plays a proper role in legislation. The
real issue for the Court seems to be its disagreement with the particu-
lar morals chosen by Texas.
128. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 660 (1887).
129. Id.
130. Respondent's Brief at 49, Lawrence (No. 02-102).
131. See 123 S. Ct. at 2484.
132. Id. ("The State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by
making their private sexual conduct a crime.").
133. For example, in North Carolina the statute that criminalizes prostitution comes
under the subchapter heading "Offenses against Public Morality and Decency." See
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-204 (2003).
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CONCLUSION
The Court's rationale in Lawrence is unlike any rationale it has
used before. It has abandoned traditional substantive due process
analysis and opened the door for itself to take a more active role in
settling public debates, rather than letting the people cast votes to
accomplish the same outcome. Nine men and women, who have not
been elected to office, are making decisions which have implications
on political issues with much public debate surrounding them. This
reality should not go on without being noticed and addressed. People
may agree with the outcome of Lawrence, but when the next case
comes before the Court and the issue is another hotly debated topic,
they may not like the way the Court decides that issue. One never
knows what side of the issue the current panel of Justices will end up
favoring at any given time. Predicting how the Court will rule will
become more and more difficult as it strays further and further from
established constitutional analysis.
Think back to the description of the town given at the beginning
of this article. It is a town where anything goes. It is a town where
government does not legislate morality. It is a town where people are
able to "search for greater freedom" for themselves. After Lawrence,
this town could soon be a reality. This is not a cause for celebration.
It is a cause for alarm. In a town where anything goes, one never
knows what will go next.
Susan Austin Blazier
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